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POLITICAL SCIENCE

A Computer Simulation Model
for Prediction of Voting in the U.N.
DOROTHY DODGE*

This paper discusses an attempt to design a computer
based simulation model that would be predictive of voting
behavior of the 127 members of the United Nations.
The Use of Computer Simulation

Simulations have been defined by Martin ( 1968) as
models of system processes or outcomes having the purpose of clarification or explanation of underlying system
variables and by Hamilton et al (1967) as models representing symbolically certain aspects of social, political
or psychological system processes. A computer simulation represents an attempt to program a theory or system
model for computer analysis. Social science models frequently are based upon structures involving tentative hypotheses or intuitive explication of parameters or variables, and computer simulation models permit the labored
analyses often necessary for theory-building and theorytesting.
Although simulation models have a variety of purposes, d1eory-building or theory-testing is a frequent usage. Harold Guetzkow observes that limited existence of
theory in the field of social science has " . . . led some
political scientists to the use of simulation as a theoretical
tool. It is through simulation that we may examine
possible relationships among any or all variables that
we are able to put into the simulation; that is, we
can use simulation as a theory-building device. Further,
we can use simulation as a theory-comparing device since
by changing the variables and relationships among them
we can generate the consequences of different theories."
Necessarily, computer simulations should replicate as
accurately as possible the referent or "real world" system
or theory to be analyzed. Sydney Verba notes: "The
process of designing a simulation forces the designer to
explicate his model of international relations. At times
this may involve not so much the creation of new perspectives on the subject as the explication of traditional
wisdom. One is forced to make explicit what may have
been the implicit assumptions about the subject matterin order that these assumptions may be placed in the operating model."
Charles Herman also stresses explication: "In designing a game or simulation, the designer is required to be
explicit about the nature and relationships between the
units in the operating model and their counterparts in the
observable universe. He must specify the conditions
which cause a relationship to vary."
Although many analyses of U.N. voting behavior, in
particular bloc and caucusing group behavior, have been
undertaken, the explication of voting behavior variables
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and their relationship to each other is a more difficult
problem about which little research has been done. The
first attempt at modeling a U.N. roll call simulation programmed a group of variables based upon literature on
the bloc or caucusing group. The testing of the validity of
the use of these variables and their relationship to each
other involves comparison with "real world" counterparts.
Prediction reliability of the model is one method that
may be employed to compare model operation and outcomes to the "real world" system. The test of model reliability is the correspondence between model output (prediction of nation-state votes) and the "real world" systems
( actual roll call votes in the General Assembly). If the
simulation does not program essential attributes of the
referent system, the simulation output should not indicate
with high accuracy the voting behavior of the U.N. system.
Prediction accuracy, then, will be used as a primary measure of model validity.
Model Construction

In undertaking construction of a prediction model, previous attempts at simulation rollcall prediction as well as
literature on U.N. voting behavior were surveyed. No reliable U.N. voting prediction model exists, but a number
of legislative rollcall simulations have shown significant
predictive reliability. One example is the model by Cleo
H . Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro for prediction
of voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. Input
variables such as party, constituency, and committee were
used. Cherryholmes and Shapiro grouped "propositions
concerning the determinants of rollcarI voting behavior"
into PREDISPOSITION and COMMUNICATION
phases in order to build a theoretical model that replicated significant aspects of the 'real world' legislative
processes." (Fig. 1)
In the PREDISPOSITION PHASE of the model
"propositions drawn from social-psychological studies of
attitude formation in general and legislative research in
particular" were employed as the essential determinants
of the voting predispositions that "emerge from the cognitions of representatives confronted with legislation."
Congressional rollcall studies were surveyed to find data
relating legislative voting behavior to discrete, explanatory variables. The variables included in the model were:
1) party affiliation; 2) constituency type; 3) section or
region, and 4) individual characteristics.
The COMMUNICATION PHASE contains propositions drawn from legislative research concerning the
"likelihood of communicative interaction between various
types of legislators," and propositions drawn from reThe Minnesota Academy of Science

search concerning possible attitude alteration occurring
from interactions between individuals with different predispositions.
The communication phase attempts to program types
of confrontations that a legislator is likely to face when
he has not developed a strong predisposition to vote for
or against a given bill.
The variables are based upon the frequency of interactions between representatives in positions of leadership
seeking to inform or exert influence on certain types of
bills. Each representative is described in terms of his
party, state, region, constituency characteristics, leadership positions, committee memberships, rank on each
committee, and seniority.
U.N.. Model Based on
Legisl'a tive Roll Call Model

The first attempt at modeling a United Nations voting
simulation was based upon modification of the Cherryholmes and Shapiro legislative model (Figure 2). Modifications included UN data rather than that for the House
of Representatives. The variables included in the predisposition and communication phases are described below.
PREDISPOSITION PHASE:

Status variables employed for the member of the
United Nations.
BLOC - A bloc is described as a group showing
high voting agreement on all or most issues before the UN. Only one group, the East European
Communist, fits this description. Although there
are other caucusing groups in the UN, their voting cohesion is limited. Other caucusing groups
therefore will be considered only in the communications phase.
COLD WAR POSITION - On some issues EastWest confrontation has been a significant consideration in the voting behavior of nations . Members of NATO, ANZUS and SEATO are coded
as Western, members of the Warsaw Pact as
Eastern, and nations belonging to none of these
alliances as Third World.
REGION - The geographic location of a nation
may be a factor in voting behavior on some issues
that come before the UN. Nations are classified
according to the following regions: Africa, Asia,
East Europe, North Atlantic, Latin America, and
Oceania.
SOCIO-CULTURAL PATTERN - Certain social
and cultural factors such as economic development, communism, size, religious culture, and the
intensiveness of agricultural land use, have been
combined into a classification scheme by Bruce
Russet. 8 Countries are classified according to the
following schedule: Afro-Asian, Western Community, Latin America, Semi-developed Latins,
Eastern Europe, and unclassifiable.
COLONIALISM - Colonialism and imperialism
may have an influence upon voting patterns in the
UN. For example the African states have opposed
*DOROTHY DODGE is chairman of the Department of
Political Science at Macalester College, St. Paul.
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voting positions taken by states such as Portugal,
France and Belgium. For purposes of coding nations that have been ruled by another since World
War II are considered anti-colonial; nations
that have held colonies since World War II are
classed pro-colonial, and nations that have neither
ruled nor been ruled during that time period, no
position.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - Many of the
questions considered by the General Assembly involve aid to developing areas or financing of U.N.
special programs or peace-keeping. The level of
economic development of a state may be a factor
in U.N. voting behavior. Nations are coded as
high, medium, low, or very low, employing the
analysis found in the Banks and Textor study, A
Cross-Polity Survey.
NATIONAL IDEOLOGY - Nations are likely to
vote in the same direction on issues of similar
content. A coding of past voting behavior may
be helpful in predicting future roll call action.
Such a past history can be quantified by classifying each resolution and computing the magnitude
and direction of previous behavior concerning
similar issues. The Rice Beyle pair agreement
study 9 of U.N. roll calls for 1960-1965 was used
to construct the past voting history.
COMMUNICATIONS PHASE:

The following are factors that may be significant to
communication patterns in the United Nations General
Assembly.
CAUCUSING GROUP - Within the General Assembly there are groups of nations that meet regularly to discuss issues and share information on
questions before the U.N. These caucusing groups
serve as one form of communication for the member nations. Some nations belong to more than one
caucusing group. Listed below are the main caucusing groups and their respective sub-groups.
The Afro-Asian Group
TheOAU
The Brazzaville group
The Casablanca group
The Asian Group
The SEATO cluster
The non-aligned core
The Arab Group
The Latin American Group
Western Europe and Other States
Benelux
The Scandinavian group
The Communist Bloc
The Commonwealth
TRADE PATTERNS -A nation may have a special relationship to nations with which it trades extensively. A pattern of influence may be indicated
quantitatively by considering the percentage of a
nation's total trade that involves another state. Total
trade was determined by adding the value of all the
imports and exports of each nation for one year.
Trade amounting to more than five percent of this
total with any one nation was considered significant
INFLUENCE - There are many factors that de-
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Figure 1. The Two Phases of the Model

Figure 2 . The Two Phases of the Model (revised)

A resolution enters the
model.

A bill enters the model.

----- - --------------Predisposition Phrase

A representative
develops a predisposition
as his attributes are
matched with those coded
on the bill.

I
The bill confronts the next
representative.

Is the representative's
predisposition
strongly positive
or negative

~

1

yes

The representative votes
on the basis of his
predisposition.

The representative
communicates with
his colleagues and,
in some cases, the
President, and develops
a new predisposition.

Communication Phase

~

The representative votes
on the basis of his new
predisposition.

I

termine influence in the General Assembly; one of
the most easily quantifiable is the percentage of the
U.N. budget that a nation is assessed. This factor is
recorded as the percentage of the total U.N. budget
for a single year.
After these revisions in input variables were made for
the legislative rollcall simulation model, the predisposition and communication phases were run in an attempt
to predict United Nations General Assembly rollcall
votes for the 1965, 1966, and 1967 sessions. Since the
U.N. has been likened to a parliamentary body in some
contemporary literature, this adaptation of a legislative
model permits some opportunity to test the parliamentary theory. On the predisposition phase of the model,
prediction reliability reached 74 percent for all rollcalls.
A further adjustment of the legislative model was necessary to allow for abstentions, which are less frequent in
legislative bodies than in the United Nations. Abstentions
were predicted if the weights ranged from -.5 to +.5
rather than the .0 of the legislative model. Analysis of
predicted and actual rollcall votes for each U.N. member
revealed that the predisposition phase was more reliable
in predicting the votes of members from developing and
non-Western nations and least reliable for developed,
Western and particularly West European states. The
model also showed greater error in prediction of East56

•

A state develops a
predisposition as its
attributes are matched
with those coded on
the resolution.

------

I

The resolutio n confronts
the next state.

I

~

Is the state's predisposition strongly positive
or negative?

no

no

------ ------

,,

Predisposition Ph rase

'

yes

The state votes on the
basis of its predisposition.

---= --

,,

Communication Phase

The state communicates
with its leaders, and in
some cases, other
leaders, and develops a
new predisposition.

~

The state votes on the
basis of its new
predisposition.

West votes of the West European states and was more
accurate for North-South issues.
Rather than following the legislative model pattern of
a shunt-out of all legislative members receiving a pre-scribed weighting in the predisposition phase, all U.N.
members were included in the communication phase of
the model. Reliability of rollcall prediction dropped to
55 percent after the communication phase. The results
suggest either that the variables programmed in the communication phase, i.e., caucusing group membership,
trade partners and influence weights, are not as significant in the U.N. decision-making process as in a legislative body, or that these variables do not model essential
factors of the referent system. Rollcall voting appears to
have been more influenced by nation-state predisposition
factors than by the communication or caucusing factors
included in the model.
These simulation runs suggest that the legislative
norms programmed by Cherryholmes and Shapiro are
not highly applicable to the prediction of U.N. decisionmaking process. However, the predisposition characteristics of nation-states included in the model suggest some
relationship to U.N. voting behavior. In order to pursue
further these predisposition characteristics, it was decided
to tum to contemporary literature analyzing nation-state
foreign policy decision-making rather than United Nations voting behavior exclusively. The analysis of this
The Minnesota Academy of Science

literature may permit a refinement of the predisposition
factors to be included in the model and possible use of
previous quantitative research to permit weighting of
these factors.
Revised U.N. Model Based
on Foreign Policy Attributes

PREDISPOSITION PHASE: The second model attempt
is based upon the hypothesis that national attributes may
be related to both United Nations and foreign policy output. An attribute is defined as a characteristic or as a descriptor. Foreign policy studies assume that the attributes
of one nation are comparable to those of another, and
that the differences between national attributes are susceptible of measurement. For example, we might state
that the GNP of the United States is greater than that of
Sweden, which is in turn, greater than that of Liberia.
The number of different attributes that might be included in the model is staggering. To group or type them
is an essential step of clarification or explication for the
model. In attempting attribute analysis, the Rosenau
study was considered. In developing his "pre-theory,"
Rosenau argues that "all foreign policy analyses either
explain the external behavior of societies in terms of
five sets of variables, or . . . their explanations can be
recast in terms of the five sets." The five sets, in their
most recent form are here discussed in relation to national attributes:
1. IDIOSYNCRATIC includes the area of personal
characteristics and perceptions of national leaders,
which will be excluded from the model since characteristics may change too frequently for time study of
U.N. voting.
2. GOVERNMENT AL/POLITICAL SYSTEM variables contain such attributes as governmental stability
and degree of democratization. Data for this variable
is derived from the Banks and Textor study, A CrossPolity Survey.
3. SOCIETAL variables include economic development, religious attachment, and educational level.
The Banks data deck provides economic characteristics for 124 countries over a ten year period.
4. EXTERNAL variables cover trade, communications, and similar elements. The Direction of Trade
Annual, published by the International Monetary
Fund as well as the Alger diplomatic flow data deck
are employed.
5. SYSTEMIC variables are, for example, geographic
region or the number of borders. Number of borders
is excluded since present studies have already shown
little or no relationship to foreign policy behavior.
Decision-making literature

Research concerning identification of predisposition
attributes and their relationship to foreign policy decision-making are numerous in the field of quantitative international politics. For example Rummel, in a 1963
study, compared dimensions of conflict behavior with
and between nations using nine domestic and thirteen
foreign conflict variables. Seventy-seven nations were
analyzed covering the years 1955-57. Factor analysis and
multiple regression results suggested that foreign and do-
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mestic conflict behavior are not generally related to and
cannot generally be predictors of each other. In a second
study using data from the same time period for sixty-nine
nations, some relationship was detected between foreign
conflict behavior and internal subversion, when demographic conditions were taken into account.
Jonathan Wilkenfeld engaged in a "re-evaluation" of
Rummel's data in an effort to identify any relationships
which may have been previously obscured. Wilkenfeld
found positive association between foreign conflict behavior and domestic subversion, revolution, and turmoil
factors for nations in different political groups.
In 1969 Tanter tested the hypothesis that political
system attributes increased the relationship between external behavior and attributes which indicate "status
inconsistency" of nation. He concluded that the regressions are "only moderate and may not yet warrant accepting them as confirming the ... hypothesis."
In a 1965 study Arthur Banks and Phillip Gregg associated political variables such as leadership and consensus with types of foreign conflict behavior in a factor
analysis of sixty-eight variables for seventy-seven nations.
Given the negative results from this research, a second
group of researchers has tested the hypothesis that patterns of foreign policy output can be related to nonbehavioral attributes. Aid or diplomatic representation
would be classed as non-behavioral interactions. Skrein
describes them as facts about what nations do and continuous phenomena rather than as events. Charles A.
McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard summarize transactions as items of action that have at some point in time
become so numerous, so commonplace, and so normal
that they are accounted for in an aggregated form. They
conclude that interactions are action items of a nonroutine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in
some clear sense are directed across a national boundary
and have, in most instances, a specific foreign target.
Charles McClelland and Robert A. Young in 1969 undertook a factor analysis of four years of WEIS data to
identify underlying dimensions of behavior. The behavior
of the sixty most active international actors were reduced
to three fairly distinct dimensions composed of the
twenty two types of behavior coded by the WEIS project. The McClelland-Young analysis was repeated for
eighty-six national actors over the forty month period.
The results yielded the same factors as the McClellandYoung analysis. The percent of all international behavior
at the "interaction" level that is associated with either the
dimensions of Non-Military Conflict or Military Conflict
was used to construct a conflict score. This measure is
intended to identify how much of any nation's behavior
falls into one of the two conflict dimensions.
PREDISPOSITION PHASE:

In devising the predisposition phase of the model, the
selection of attributes based upon foreign policy decisionmaking literature was difficult. Attribute numbers are almost infinite, and their relation to decision-making is
tentative or of limited correlation. The Karl Deutsch re57

search principle of economy and getting "the greatest
amount of useful information from the smallest body of
data" was adopted, and the following variables were
chosen for testing:
1. Demographic attributes are frequently employed in
decision-making research. Three demographic variables are included: population size and population
growth rate taken from the U.N. Demographic Yearbook. Borders are excluded since research already
shows little relationship.
2. A second group of attributes frequently employed are
economic variables. The Banks data deck including
GDP, literacy, inhabitants per physician, and consumption of energy for 124 nations are included.
3. The governmental/societal index attempts to provide
a scale for what Bruce Russett has termed the complexity and specialization of political institutions or
Cutright's concept that a politically developed nation
has more complex and specialized national political
institutions than a less politically developed nation.
For purposes of our model, the Banks and Textor
Cross-Polity Survey is used to provide governmental/
societal indicators.
4. A final set of indicators is transactional, responding
to non-behavioral attribute research. These measure
different types of national involvement with other
countries. The Alger data deck providing diplomatic
exchange data and a direction of trade deck containing the five highest trade partners for 124 states
are included in this set of indicators.
COMMUNICATIONS PHASE:

A third group of foreign policy literature sees external
forces as the initiators of behavior and internal factors as
mediators of these factors. One general concept designated as a significant mediator between the external environment and the actions of a national actor is "image."
For example, Festinger hypothesizes that the effectiveness of communication depends on:
Whether the recipient attends to it;
Whether be learns its contents, and;
Whether be accepts the contents.

"Attentiveness" also is identified as a relevant variable by a number of authors in the field of political behavior and international relations. Attenttiveness is
treated either as an intervening variable between impinging forces and action or as a useful indicator even
though its sources are ignored.
Bruce M. Russett's work on Anglo-American relations indicates that there is a direct relationship between
what might be called the positive attentiveness of one
country to the other and the positive actions of one country toward the other (and therefore, perhaps its voting
agreement) .
Karl Deutsch as a result of a 1956 study concluded
that the aspect of politics that is constituted by communication includes " . .. the areas of attention, of perception, and orientation, of values and evaluation, of
goal-seeking and of decision-making."
T . M. Newcomb suggests that an actor's "readiness to
respond" to given external situations and events depends
58

to some extent on the actor's "attraction" toward the objects and subjects of communication.
Hypotheses from these studies suggest that the amount
of trade flowing between two nations may be directly related to the amount of attention they devote to each
other; and that the amount of high-level government
action directed by one nation to another is directly related to the amount of attention devoted.
The Skrein study of United Kingdom transactions suggests that how much action a nation engages in at the
"interaction" level, how much trade flows between the
United Kingdom and a nation, and how much action at
the interaction revel is targeted by a nation to the United
Kingdom account for 71 percent of the variance in
United Kingdom attention across eighty-six nations.
The variables used in the communication phase will
attempt to employ the results from the "attention" and
"image" studies. The variables included are:
Direction of trade data
U.N. caucusing group membership
The Alger diplomatic trade data deck
WEIS transaction data

The use of these attributes from previous foreign
policy decision-making studies in constructing the simulation model will permit some testing of whether these
attributes are applicable to U.N. decision-making behavior; and which, if any, of these attributes serve as
better predictors for U.N. voting behavior.
The attributes included in the predisposition and communication phases will be correlated to previous voting
coalition analysis. Two hundred and twenty General Assembly rollcall votes were analyzed for the period 19601965 for the 114 member nations of that period, using
the Rice-Beyle method. This method analyzes a sample
of rollcall votes by plotting the pair agreement of all
members of the body to be studied. Indices of agreement
which exceed a certain arbitrary percentage selected as a
standard for voting cohesion are noted and patterns of
voting agreement indicated. Rice and Beyle differed
somewhat on their agreement indices. Beyle indicated
maximum cohesion at 100.00 and used an index of 0.0
to 100.00 to represent the degree to which unity was
approached. Rice employed a percentage of agreement
index. Cohesion was indicated by the percentage of roll
call votes on which two members voted alike. In the
Dodge study, an arbitrary index of cohesion was placed
at 66.66 and above. Using these Rice-Beyle cohesion
percentages for the 1960-1965 period, each attribute
listed in the predisposition and communication phases
will be analyzed for possible relationship to high or low
voting cohesion in the U.N.
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APPENDIX A
Predisposition and Communication Code Book
Original Model for Rollcall Prediction
I.B.M.
card column

1-3
4-5
6-7

Variable

Nation identification number
skip
geographic region
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Code Numbers-explanation

0-126
skip
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08

Found in alphabetical
listing of the nations.

South America
Central America
North America
West Europe
East Europe
Oceanic
Mideast
Southeast Asia

59

I.B.M.
card column

8

Variable

socio-cultural region

Code Numhcrs- explanation

09
10
11
I
2

3
4
5

0
9

IO

11

12-13
14-15
16-17
18-19
20-31
32-33
34-35
36-37
38-39

40-42
43-47

48-50
51-55
56-58
59-63
64-66
67-71
72-76

60

Cold War Position

1
2

Orient;il
North Africa
Central and South Africa
Afro-Asia
Western Community
Latin America
Semi-Developed Latins
Eastern Europe
Unclassified
West

East
3 Third World
0 Unclassified
Colonialism
1 Colonial Power
2 Anti-Colonial State
3 Other
Economic Development 1 High
2 Medium
Status
3 Low
4 Very Low
0 Not classified
ideological factor #J
00-99
( peaceful settlement)
00-99
ideological factor #2
(self-determination)
ideological factor #3
00-99
( collective measures)
ideological factor #4
00-99
(social human)
skip
skip
caucus group I
01 Afro-Asia
02 African
caucus group 2
03 Brazzaville Conference
04 Casablanca Conference
caucus group 3
05 Asian Group
06 SEATO Cluster
caucus group 4
07 Non-aligned care
08 Arab Group
09 Latin American
10 Western European
and Other States
11 Benelux
12 Scandinavian Group
13 Communist Bloc
14 Commonwealth
greatest tra ding partner 111-126 (partner's ID number)
% trade with greatest .0000-XX.XX
partner
(four numbers and decimal point)
e.g. .5643
3.145
33.67
000-126
2nd greatest
trading partner
.0000-XX.XX
% of trade with
2nd partner
3rd greatest
000-126
trading partner
.0000-XX.XX
% of trade with
3rd partner
4th greatest
000-126
trading partner
% with 4th
.0000-XX.XX
trading partner
Per Cent of
.0000-XX.XX
U.N. Budget
(four numbers and decimal point)
e.g.. 0016
6.432
21 .87
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